

ANTHROPOLOGICA SLOVACA



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ON THE BRINK OF CHANGE?**
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EDITORIÁL

Milé čitateľky, milí čitatelia,

Dostáva sa vám do rúk tretie číslo časopisu Slovenskej asociácie sociálnej antropológie *Anthropologica Slovaca*. Číslo otvára prehľadová štúdia Terézie Suránovej o albánskej identite a migráciách. Autorka v ňom popisuje obmedzenia pohybu ľudí počas predchádzajúceho režimu a následné migračné vlny po jeho páde v 90. rokoch 20. storočia. Venuje sa procesom akulturácie a skrývania albánskej kultúry v hostovských krajinách ako dôsledkov stigmatizácie Albáncov. Načrtáva demografiu jednotlivých migračných vln a poukazuje na posun v demografickom zložení migrantov veľkých migračných vln v 90. rokoch a neskorších migráciách po roku 2000. V závere textu sa venuje remitanciám, ktoré predstavujú dôležitý prvok miestnej ekonomie a sociálnej stratifikácie.

Nasleduje príspevok Juraja Podobu, v ktorom podáva svoj názor na periodické hodnotenie akademických pracovísk. Vyjadruje sa v ňom k vývoju a zmysluplnosti takehoto hodnotenia v kontexte slovenských akademických pracovísk.

Ďalším textom je komentár Dáši Bombjakovej ku konceptu osobnej autonómie v spoločnostiach rovnostárskych lovcov a zberačov. Autorka v ňom poukazuje na heterogénnosť definícií osobnej autonómie a navrhuje popísať alebo uviesť príklady prejavov osobnej autonómie v týchto spoločnostiach v ich aktuálnom kontexte a tiež včleniť do tohto popisu ďalšie dodatočné informácie, akými sú, napríklad, hodnota alebo prax ako aj oblasti života a kultúry, v ktorých sa osobná autonómia uplatňuje alebo manifestuje.

Číslo uzatvárajú Ines Chrtán a Filip Boberić správou z 11. konferencie Medzinárodnej asociácie pre antropológiu juhovýchodnej Európy, ktorú minulý rok zorganizovala Katedra antropológie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity v Prištine.

Prajeme vám zaujímavé a podnetné čítanie!

Elena Sims Fejdi



Albania became a candidate for EU membership in 2022 and would ideally like to join the Union by 2030. However, the prime minister considers these expectations too ambitious.
Author: Terézia Suránová

RELIC OF THE PAST, OR A NATION ON THE BRINK OF CHANGE?

Remittances, identity, and the structure of Albanian migration

Terézia Suránová

Albania represents a rather unique environment for studying migration. The last three decades since the fall of the Iron Curtain were characterized by mass displacement – proportionally the biggest emigration from any former Eastern bloc country, and arguably the world’s most dramatic example of mass emigration in the ’90s (King, 2003: 283). By 2022, more than 30% of the population was living abroad, ranking in third place globally (Buchholz, 2022). After decades of complete isolation, the borders opened up again, leading to a complete restructuring of local realities (Abrahams, 2020; de Waal, 2006; King, 2003). In the span of this timeframe, Albania experienced three waves of reactive mass migration, leading to a more stabilized migratory pattern since the early 2000s (Azzarri & Carletto, 2009).

As proposed by Featherstone (1996: 64-65): “*Locality and globality must be considered as interrelated processes*”. Contemporary migration doesn’t adhere to assumptions of simple unidirectional relocation, but rather exhibits diverse forms, methods, and destinations connected to the dynamics of global capitalism. Migration flows are dynamic and more complex, creating human networks and strategic adaptations (Bobić & Janković, 2017: 15). Amidst socio-political and economic shifts, the practice of remittances, embodied in practices such as housing construction, emerged as a pivotal aspect of transnational connectivity, not only by fostering a sense of economic stability in a dynamic world but also reshaping social relationships and bridging physical distances (Dalakoglou, 2010). Additionally, migrants

utilize social media and connections to assert their agency in navigating their transnational identity (Gemi, 2019).

This essay will look into the recent biography of Albanian migration, considering its historical, cultural, and socio-economic aspects. It will explore how Albanian migration and activities across borders affect Albania's socio-economic

growth, political landscape, and cultural identity both at home and among its diaspora. By conducting a multiplicity of interviews with migrants returning to Albania during the summer periods of 2023 and 2024, either for family visits or vacations on the popular Adriatic Coast, I tried to bridge my observations with well-established literature.

Socialism, the freeze of mobility

Albania under socialism can be considered one of the harshest and most isolationist dictatorships in the communist bloc, and arguably, the whole world (de Waal, 2006). During the 40 years of Enver Hoxha's rule, emigration was formally impossible – any attempt to leave the country was met with gunfire or severe punishment, affecting the whole family (Domachowska, 2019; O'Donnell, 1999: 136). Borders were wired by electrical fences at complete length and closely watched by the military hidden in concrete bunkers scattered across the landscape. The state employed all means to stop any attempt to pass, relying heavily on spies and whistleblowing, which happened many times within family and close friends (King, 2003; Rejmer, 2021). This constant surveillance led to the creation of a siege mentality (O'Donnell, 1999: 137), where one felt closely watched by the state at all times.

The guards in both Greece and ex-Yugoslavia were also ready to send back migrants anytime, so the passing of borders wasn't necessarily an automatic success. Even if the individual managed to escape, the remaining family became imprisoned and tortured (Rejmer, 2021). The borders were guarded by soldiers deployed from remote villages to avoid any chance of empathy when dealing with attempts to escape.

Not only external but also internal migration was highly restricted and controlled by central planning of the ruling party. Displacement was widely used as a political tool to enforce punishment

and coercion. Most citizens (more than two-thirds) were residing in rural areas (Hall, 1996), working in collectivized agriculture or in smaller factories. Albania became completely self-reliant in the '80s as a result of its diplomatic break with Maoist China (King, 2003: 284). Displacement of workers to rural areas was therefore considered a necessity for the political establishment.

The collapse of the Albanian economy resulting in harsh isolationist politics and the end of the one-man rule after the death of Hoxha in 1985 created a sudden momentum (Abrahams, 2020; de Waal, 2006). The domino effect of democratization swept through the whole of Europe, and lastly, also the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, which dissolved in 1991. The emergence of mass migration phenomena began in the early '90s with the end of the communist regime of Enver Hoxha's successor Ramiz Alia. Thousands were camping in front of foreign embassies and large-scale student protests were organized, leading to the regime's definite collapse. The first issue of passports by the end of 1990, to citizens other than the political elite, made travel possible for the first time since 1945, leading to what can be called the "most dramatic post-communist migration" (King, 2003: 283).

After the end of socialism, Albania was considered the poorest country in Europe, shaped by large scarcity resulting from its deep isolationism – for decades it was merely an economic ruin maintained by force¹. The collapse of

¹ Hoxha first cut diplomatic ties with Tito's Yugoslavia (1948). Later, with the death of Stalin, Albania also broke its relationship with the Soviet Union (1956), with Communist China remaining the sole ally providing economic aid and trade agreements. With the deepening of Hoxha's paranoia in the '70s, China was also deemed as unfavorable and therefore Albania became a completely isolated country in 1977 (King, 2003).



Abandoned dwelling in the isolated mountains near Komani Lake. The family has moved to Germany for better job opportunities, however they still come back to their land to appreciate their origins.
Author: Terézia Suránová



Waiting room at the bus station, Elbasan
Author: Terézia Suránová

the centrally planned state structure, which paradoxically provided Albanians with work, income, and welfare, followed by a period of chaos, left them without any certainty about their future (Jarvis, 2000; Musaraj, 2017). The socio-economic conditions of the country drove hundreds of thousands out of the country immediately, seeking refuge mainly in bordering Greece and Italy. Many arrived via high-powered dinghies across the Strait of Otranto or through Greece and (former) Yugoslavia, while some migrants utilized ferries or planes with visitor visas or false documents and overstayed after the end of their permit (King & Mai, 2014).

The images of overcrowded migrant boats reaching “fortress Europe” became an iconic symbol of the urgent desire to flee Albania. At first, the attitude of the host countries was relatively welcoming (Zinn, 1996), perceiving them as refugees escaping an oppressive regime, but soon these attitudes shifted, blocking and returning many migrants (King & Mai, 2014; King & Vullnetari, 2009). It is estimated that during the first three years of the regime’s dissolution, more than 200,000 people left the country either legally or illegally, even under the risk of being repatriated (King, 2003). The will to migrate to Greece and Italy specifically cannot be attributed merely to their

proximity. The motivation was often-times beyond monetary aspirations, as many Albanians migrated with the vision of personal liberation and self-expression, especially dissidents and politically oppressed groups (King, 2005: 141).

During the last years of communist rule, more and more people in Albania were finding ways to gain access to Western television and radio channels, producing an artificial and largely idealistic image of life in democratic Italy. Even before their migration plans became materialized, Albanians, particularly teenagers and young adults, had already undergone a process of “anticipatory assimilation” into the Italian way of life. This new imagined identity of freedom and modernity posed a strong contrast to the forcedly homogenized, nationalist, and collectivist landscape of Hoxha’s despotic rule (King & Mai, 2014; Mai, 2002: 262). Similar conclusions were made by Gilles de Rapper in Greece, stating that Albanians idolized the Greek way of life as the “embodiment of culture” (de Rapper, 2002: 199). This image was confronted with reality as soon as it became obvious that Albanian migrants would face numerous hardships related to their marginal position in Europe, always remaining the subordinate “other”, both economically and socially.

Pyramid schemes and second wave of mass migration

When the socio-economic transformation modeled by free-market ideologies began, the country was in a state of desperate poverty, the vast majority of its population being unfamiliar with market institutions and financial practices. The election of the democratic party in 1992 gave Albania and the international observers great hope, visioning quick reforms and development. People were suddenly eager to invest or deposit their savings with visions of great profit (Musaraj, 2017). The economy was also greatly supported by international loans and Western aid, leading to a period of relative stabilization (Abrahams, 2020), lowering migration rates

or even motivating the return of migrants (King, 2003). This idealistic period, however, didn’t last long.

At this time, practices such as money laundering and trafficking (substances, weapons, and humans) further stimulated the sphere of gray economy, and in turn provided sources for the payment of quick returns for investors in pyramid schemes (Jarvis, 2000). The local investors, called *kreditorë*, found their main sources of cash investment in remittances sent from migrants abroad and sales of privatized land and apartments. Many Albanians even sold their houses, land, and livestock to invest. Fully legal and officially backed by the government,

the funds used these (mainly foreign) investments to circulate cash, with liabilities greatly exceeding real assets (Musaraj, 2017: 321).

At their zenith, the pyramid schemes' liabilities reached nearly half of the nation's GDP, with approximately two-thirds of the Albanian population investing in them. The competition of investment funds to offer higher and completely unsustainable interest rates on deposits led some companies to offer more than 30% a month (Jarvis, 2000; Musaraj, 2017). With the first big company unable to fulfill its payments, a great decline in the public's confidence in these institutions began to dry up deposit transactions, leading to the bankruptcy of main investment funds in late 1996 (Jarvis, 2000). The political and social consequences of the sudden collapse of pyramid schemes were massive, with the whole country falling into a state of complete anarchy.

The World Bank estimated that Albanians lost more than 1.2 billion dollars in savings during this period, equal to half of the country's GDP. The fall of the government and mass riot-

ing led to unrest which later escalated into a full-blown civil war, during which more than 2000 people were killed (Jarvis, 2000). These events fueled another wave of mass exodus of Albanians. At first, the attitudes of host countries were welcoming, but, again, this positive outlook quickly shifted. Intensive Italian military patrols, including surveillance in Albanian waters, halted the mass displacement (King, 2003).

The third wave of mass migration came with the emergence of war in Kosovo, when approximately 500,000 ethnic Albanians (Gheghs) fled from Milošević's Yugoslavia into the mountainous north of Albania, seeking refuge (King, 2005). With Kosovars continuing their migratory route further into Europe, many Albanians emigrated alongside them, this time preferring countries like the UK and Germany which provided greater support for war asylum seekers. Since most of the refugees traveled without any official documents, it was hard to distinguish between Kosovars fleeing war and northern Albanians, since they were speaking the same dialect and shared cultural similarities (King, 2005: 138).

Migration and identity

Regarding integration, Albanian migrants appear to lean towards assimilation in their host country. There's a strong inclination to adopt social norms, often even downplaying differences and striving for a sense of invisibility. Yet, this will to "blend in" surprisingly coincides with limited bonding and social capital (Gemi, 2019). They undergo what Gordon (1964) calls 'acculturation without assimilation'. The rejection of their identity leads Albanians to hide their culture, religion, and language in order to function in their host countries, which are largely hostile towards their cultural practices (King & Mai, 2014). Negative attitudes are also prevalent because of the fact that first-generation Albanian migrants mostly took up low-status, oftentimes illegal jobs necessary for their economic survival (Gemi, 2014).

The social integration process into the host countries came with a great deal of difficulties, with tendencies such as *Albanophobia* being prevalent in nations with high rates of Albanian expats. These cultural barriers stigmatizing Albanians as criminals, or undesirable savages posing a threat to national unity (King & Mai, 2014; Mai, 2005) may oftentimes fuel the desire of migrants to return to their home country (Gemi, 2014).

Negative tendencies can lead to deep internalization of otherness, even though the usual destination countries are paradoxically the ones that are the most culturally similar (King & Mai, 2014). These images are often exalted and reinforced by the media, portraying Albanians as a threat to the host nation and its security. According to Mai (2003), in the early 1990s, as Italy aimed for a unified European identity, Albanians

replaced the “poor Italian southerner” as the new focus of xenophobia and colonial othering. They symbolized the outsider/insider immigrant, seen as “dange-

rous” due to their cultural and physical proximity to Italians, reminding them of Italy’s impoverished southern past (Mai, 2003).

Demographics of migration

Albanian migration during the '90s could be demographically characterized by young, undocumented males finding provisional ways of escaping the country to the bordering countries by foot or small rubber boats *gommoni*, the migration being largely operated by traffickers (King, 2005). However, since the early 2000s, Albanian migration has become more steady and managed, with no extreme migration episodes. There has been an increased control of the Albanian borders resulting from multiple agreements with the EU, with the aspiration to join the Union. There has also been a steady shift to the preference of legalized migration, with an increasing number of females and children joining their male heads of household, who had already established a livelihood in

the newly inhabited country. Second generations are being born in countries of destination, often well assimilated into their new environments (King & Mai, 2014).

After the fall of socialism, a great deal of internal migration began to take place as well. Bad conditions, especially in the isolated rural areas where collectivized farms were dissolved (King, 2003), led Albanians to seek a better life in bigger cities, mainly in Tirana, and the closest port of Durrës. Nikas and Aspasios (2011) also point to the shift from permanent to temporary migration and seasonal work, with the residential base remaining in Albania. New laws implemented in Italy and Greece allow short-term and seasonal migration to fill in labor gaps in agriculture and tourism.

Remittances and symbolic presence

Migrants can have a substantial social and economic influence on their home country even in their physical absence. Remittances represent one of the main ways by which an impact on the local communities can be made (Ramamurthy, 2003: 28-29). Albania ranks amongst the top 20 countries in remittance flows compared to the percentage of the country’s GDP (Vullnetari & King 2011). Remittances represent a large part of the local economy, contributing to the well-being of the receiving families, alleviating poverty, and developing the country as a whole² (Gëdeshi & King, 2018; Maroukis & Gemi, 2011). Except for the crisis in 1997 and the global recession of 2008, remittance rates have been increasing rapidly, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, reaching 900 million USD during 2023, breaking historical records (Bank of Albania, 2024).

It is rather difficult to track down the amount of remittances transferred to

Albania, since most of this capital travels irregularly and through informal channels (Arrehag et al., 2005), either coming into the country with migrants themselves, their friends, bus drivers, or by money transfer companies such as Western Union. Inconsistent patterns in remittance transfers can be ascribed to a range of factors, including the unpredictable nature of remittances, fluctuations in migrants’ income, their working conditions, and their legal status throughout migration (Arrehag et al., 2005). The deeply habituated lack of trust towards official financial institutions and banks when transferring money back to Albania was presumably established back in 1997 with the collapse of the economy. The state failed to intervene in the horrendous loss of personal savings, leaving many in desperate poverty and on the brink of civil war. These vivid memories may enforce the will to rely on personal relations instead of

² These two are, of course, intertwined.



A man on the beach in the seaside village of Dhërmi, which in recent years has experienced an unprecedented surge in tourism that has led to megalomaniacal development projects across the South coast.
Author: Terézia Suránová



institutional channels. Sending back remittances by informal channels can furthermore have prosocial effects on the relationships between individuals and communities (Dalakoglou, 2010).

Although a great deal of remittances are targeted at everyday necessities, this foreign capital is also used for business investment, improvement in housing, or financing education (Arrehag et al., 2005). Remittances can also contribute to conspicuous consumption, using symbols of wealth such as cars, clothing, and opulent housing to negotiate status and prestige within the home communities (Dalakoglou, 2010). As of 2001, remittances were considered the main distinguishing factor between poor and well-off families (World Bank, 2001, as cited in Hoti, 2009). Remittances can therefore also present certain negatives to the local environment, especially by increasing inequality between households receiving remittances compared to those who do not (Castaldo & Reilly, 2007). Remittances can also form an over-dependent relationship on this form of irregular income, decreasing local (low-wage) labor initiatives, and further promoting migration (Ramamurthy, 2003: 63).

There are many factors influencing remittance patterns – gender and kinship being one of them. The general tendency to send back finances usually falls on “breadwinning” males, remitting either to the nuclear family left behind, or their side of the family. Either way, remittances are usually targeted towards the closest kin (Arrehag et al., 2005: 22). The recipients are also usually males, receiving and distributing financial help as the head of the household (King & Vullnetari, 2003). The house of wives’ upbringing usually doesn’t receive

remittances, and if so, these finances are usually channeled through women in secrecy, or further utilizing alternative ways of supporting their side of kin (Smith, 2009).

In times of economic turbulence, following the fall of socialism, migration became one of the main priorities in order to secure a better future for one-self and closest family (King & Mai, 2014). The motivation of financial and material remittance to the home country soon became reflected in local house-building patterns. The emergence of migrant dwellings can be interpreted as a strengthening of symbolic ties between the global and local spheres (Dalakoglou, 2010).

Long-lasting political turmoil and weakness of the rule of law, combined with absurd bureaucracy gave rise to the informal economy, mainly through the construction of buildings, settlements and semi-legal businesses (Dalakoglou, 2010). As mentioned earlier, remittances typically occur within personalized channels, rather than bank transfers. This deepens the relationship of migrants with people in their home country, creating a sense of their proxy-presence, even when physically absent. In the context of the newly experienced distances and dislocations in postsocialist Albania, the migrant house-making process not only serves as a stimulating force in making sense of a dynamic, transnational world. It also plays a crucial role in the making and redefining existing social relationships, bridging physical distances. Dwelling can be seen as a symbol of permanence in the constantly changing socio-political reality (Dalakoglou, 2010).

Transnationalism and returns

Since the relative stabilization of the economy (at least compared to the turbulent '90s), return migration has become a rising phenomenon (Domachowska, 2019). Even though Albania still faces great political and economic challenges, visible in aspects such as bad

infrastructure, corruption, clientelism, and poor education, the will to create a competitive market environment is significantly rising, especially in the last few years with the extreme growth of tourism. Albanians are coming back from Western countries to establish busi-

nesses in the tourist hubs or the capital, which has seen rapid development.³

Return to home country does not have to be permanent – most of the migrants are coming back on a yearly basis to visit their country of origin. In his ethnographic account of a ritual stroll (*xhiro*) in a small town Rrëshen, Hemming (2009) points to the status paradox of migration and the local demonstration of the new social position it holds. Migrants are oftentimes considered elite in their home country, conspicuously displaying their wealth in public spaces during returns, whilst remaining at the bottom of the social

strata in their host countries, living in bad conditions and earning low wage incomes. By producing an artificial image of their well-being, they are responding to the demands and expectations of their family, friends, and local community (Hemming, 2009).

The nature and extent of transnational activities are mainly influenced by how integrated migrants are in their host countries and how open the opportunities are in their home countries. In the context of Albanian migrants in Vienna, it's evident that stronger integration reduces the scope and intensity of their transnational engagement (Gemi, 2019).

³ Based on my interviews and observations during the summer of 2023.

Conclusion

The socio-cultural and economic landscape of modern Albania exhibits remarkable dynamism, influenced by both transnationalism and local tradition following the collapse of socialism. The socioeconomic and political turmoil following the collapse of the regime in 1991 greatly increased social stratification and differences, which posed a great difficulty in the construction of a common identity (De Waal, 2006). The contemporary history of Albanian migration points to several polarities⁴, which perhaps shaped the ideas and motivations behind mass expulsion. When the migration project became successful, the highly idealized image of the Western, free world was oftentimes

met with great disappointment (Gemi, 2014; King & Mai, 2014).

Shaped by the legacy of its communist past, Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. Even though the country has seen considerable economic growth since the dissolution of the socialist regime, this development is decelerated by sociocultural factors such as clientelism, corruption, bad infrastructure, and depopulation (Gregorić Bon, 2022). Migration therefore stands in a peculiar relation to the contemporary development of Albania, bridging capital and workforce flows, new socio-cultural identities as well as a redefinition of a sense of belonging in the transnational world we inhabit.

⁴ Freedom vs captivity; plenty vs scarcity; plurality vs homogeneity; democracy vs despotism; progress vs backwardness or more generally, West vs Albania.

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ČO (NIELEN) O ANTROPOLÓGII PREZRADILO PERIODICKÉ HODNOTENIE

Juraj Podoba

S hodnotením akademických pracovísk mám skúsenosť „od začiatku“ – teda od neskorej jesene roku 1992, kedy som ako mladý vedecký tajomník Národopisného ústavu SAV zapíňal predpísané tabuľky údajmi o vedeckej produkcii tohto pracoviska. Bolo krátko po kolapse totalitného režimu, nezadržateľne sa blížil rozpad federácie a narastala kritika inštitucionalizovaných akademických štruktúr, ktorá začala už v neskorých rokoch perestrojky. Naša vrcholná vedecká inštitúcia sa rozhodla, že sa podrobí sebahodnoteniu. Aj keď som bol vtedy akademický elév a o štandardnej vedeckej scientometrii som vlastne ani netušil, tabuľky som vyplňal nielen s nechutou, ale aj s istým údivom. Bolo zrejmé, že okolo „evalvácie“ panuje značná neistota. Ani bohorovné „vševediace“ akademické authority zjavne celkom netušili, čo je vlastne potrebné urobiť a načo je to dobré. Ak dnes uvažujeme pod dojemom výsledkov ak-

tuálneho periodického hodnotenia akademických pracovísk a vedeckých odborov o protirečeniach, ktoré hodnotenie prináša, je potrebné hľadať korene týchto protirečení práve v uvedenom rozporuplnom období. Na jednej strane nielen byrokratické „reálnosocialistické“ akademické inštitúcie, ale celé akademické komunity vytrvalo odmietali akceptovať štandardné scientometrické kritériá a hodnotiace postupy. Na strane druhej aj do akademického prostredia – napriek doslova zúrivému odporu predovšetkým v humanitných disciplínach – drzo vtrhla nielen akademická sloboda, ale aj nevyhnutnosť konfrontovať sa s vedeckou produkciou v európskych a svetových akademických centrách na nelúboosť nielen akademických súdruhov a súdružiek, ale celých zástupov ich klientov, chránencov a adlátusov. A kamošov. Celý akademický priestor sa voľky-nevoľky postupne otváral. Teda skôr nevoľky, čo vysvetľuje

tridsať rokov neutíchajúci cirkus okolo evalvácií akademických pracovísk a charakter správy o stave slovenskej akadémie, ktorú prinášajú výsledky najnovšieho periodického hodnotenia.

Evalvácie sa pravidelne opakovali, čo zakaždým prinášalo veľa bizarných zážitkov. Spočiatku mali viac charakter frašky ako premysleného úsilia o skvalitnenie akademického prostredia a o postupný prienik slovenskej vedy na európsku excelentnú úroveň. Samozrejme, o tomto sa veľa a kvetnato rečnilo, ale vždy po ukončení evalvačného procesu zostávala v ústach nepríjemná pachuť. Osobne som bol s ťažko akceptovateľným priebehom a výsledkami evalvácie vedecko-výskumných pracovísk SAV konfrontovaný v tretine nultých rokov v pozícii predsedu Vedeckej rady vyššie spomínaného ústavu SAV. Z perspektívy člena Snemu SAV som mal počas celých nultých rokov možnosť sledovať neutíchajúce a neplodné konfrontácie týkajúce sa hodnotenia vedeckej (akademickej) práce, čo v umiernennej forme pokračovalo v nasledujúcom desaťročí v Akademickom senáte UK.

Absencia elementárnej schopnosti a záujmu akademickej komunity dohodnúť sa na akceptovateľnom spôsobe hodnotenia akademických pracovísk, resp. vedeckých výstupov, ktorý by bol kompatibilný so štandardom v akademickom prostredí západného civilizačného okruhu, a teda európskymi akademikmi všeobecne zdieľaných evalvačných mechanizmov, viedlo k uplatňovaniu dielčích modelov hodnotenia, často limitovaných na menší okruh akademikov pôsobiacich v rámci jedného malého pracoviska alebo vedeckej disciplíny s čudnými hodnotiacimi kritériami. Zároveň bola zdrojom permanentných, často až nechutných konfliktov a napätí, ktoré kontaminovali atmosféru v akademickom prostredí a brzdili, resp. brzdia progres jednotlivých vedeckých disciplín aj akademických pracovísk. Z hľadiska pozície spoločenských vied v rámci akademického inštitucionálneho priestoru, ale aj celkovo v spoločnosti, sú dôležité hlavne dva momenty.

Prvým z nich je permanentná dehonestácia až zosmiešňovanie tejto skupiny vied zo strany akademických funkcionárov a politikov vedy z prostredia exaktných, hlavne fyzikálno-chemických vied. Spája sa s ňou aj neschopnosť či neochota vnímať neobyčajne heterogénnu kvalitu tejto až bezbrehej skupiny disciplín, z ktorých časť už ani nespadá do rámca kategórie „spoločenská/humanitná veda“. Jedným z dôsledkov je všeobecne rozšírený predsudok, ktorý kladie hranicu oddeľujúcu excelentnú vedu od okrajovej vedeckej produkcie medzi exaktné a spoločenské vedy. Tento predsudok preukazuje vyvrátili až výsledky najnovšieho periodického hodnotenia, aj keď sa na jeho neopodstatnenosť dlhodobo upozorňovalo. Žiaľ, doposiaľ bezúspešne.

Druhým kľúčovým momentom sú práve čudné, často pochybné kritériá hodnotenia vedeckej práce a vedeckých výstupov v spoločenskovednom prostredí, ktoré dlhodobo, ale cieľavedome podkopávajú ich smerovanie na úroveň excelentnej vedy s medzinárodne akceptovateľnými vedeckými výstupmi. Orientované boli, resp. sú hlavne proti tým jednotlivcom alebo skupinám sociálnych vedcov, ktorí sa buď čiastkovo alebo výslovene programovo orientovali týmto smerom s cieľom ich dôslednej marginalizácie v slovenskej akadémii. Veľmi tomu napomohla masifikácia vysokého školstva od deväťdesiatych rokov a s ňou spojené masové zakladanie tlačiarň na diplomy a manufaktúr na produkciu otitulovaných individuí, ktoré sa z nie celkom zrozumiteľných dôvodov u nás označujú termínom „univerzita“. Dovolím si tvrdiť, že výsledky periodického hodnotenia spoločenskovedných odborov a pracovísk jasne zrkadlia tieto rozpory.

Od nultých rokov situáciu navyše komplikovali vstupy rôznych záhadných aktivít a iniciatív mimo akademického pôvodu. Za všetky spomeňme aspoň agentúru s príznačným názvom ARRA. Korene týchto tendencií nepochybne súvisia s pretrvávajúcim nezaujmom slovenskej spoločnosti o kvalitné vzdelanie pre mladé generácie a o kvalitné vedecké bádanie aj na našich univerzitách

a vedecko-výskumných inštitúciách. Po-
stoje aj reálne politiky formujúcej sa
post-totalitnej politickej triedy a na ňu
naviazanej štátnej byrokracie tri desať-
ročia kopírujú tento nezaujem.

Opakované evalvácie situáciu za-
hmlievali, znejasňovali, vytvárali a dl-
hodobo udržiavali najrôznejšie pred-
sudky a všeobecne rozšírené, často ilu-
zórne alebo dlhodobo a cieľavedome
fabrikované predstavy o konkrétnych
akademických pracoviskách alebo ce-
lých vedeckých odboroch. Nie je dôle-
žité, či viac pozitívne alebo negatívne, či
adoračné alebo dehonestáčne. Dôležité
je, že v princípe falošné.

Metodika nedávneho periodického
hodnotenia akademických pracovísk
a odborov po 30 rokoch vniesla do aka-
demického sveta pokus o kvalitatívnu
klasifikáciu slovenského akademického
priestoru. Na rozdiel od minulosti ide
o štandardnú metodiku hodnotenia. Vý-
znamným posunom je už to, že až na
zriedkavé výnimky boli z evalvačného
procesu vylúčení domáci (rozumej aj čes-
kí) hodnotitelia. Časť hodnotiteľov pred-
stavovali skutočné vedecké osobnosti
v rámci konkrétnej skupiny vedeckých
disciplín. Na základe tridsaťročnej skú-
senosti, bez takéhoto prístupu k výberu
hodnotiteľov nie je v slovenských pod-
mienkach vôbec zmysluplné pokúšať
sa o vyčlenenie excelentnej, ale aj nadpri-
emernej vedy z masy priemerných výstu-
pov/výsledkov, donedávna ani tých hlb-
ko podpriemerných. Nakoľko je meto-
dika všeobecne dostupná na webovej
stránke Ministerstva školstva SR, nebu-
dem ju viac komentovať.

Jedným zo základných prínosov pe-
riodického hodnotenia je rozvrátenie
najrôznejších mýtov, neopodstatnených,
ale široko zdieľaných predstáv a pred-
sudkov, ktoré počas uplynulých desať-
ročí slúžili ako východisko k autorita-
tívnemu posudzovaniu akademických
inštitúcií a celých vedeckých odborov, ale
aj jednotlivcov, ktorí pracujú v danom
konkrétnom odbore/vedeckej disciplí-
ne. Vytvárala sa a následne sa petrifikova-
vala hierarchia pracovísk, vedeckých od-
borov a disciplín, ale aj vedeckých osob-
ností (a „vedeckých osobností“) práve na

základe takto konštruovaných predstáv,
ktoré – ako sa obávam už dlhé roky – ne-
majú veľa spoločného so serióznym úsi-
lím posunúť slovenskú vedu do európ-
skeho akademického priestoru ani s pod-
porou excelentnosti vo vede. Celej aka-
demickkej komunite sa vnucovali krité-
riá relevantné pre jednu či dve skupiny
vedeckých disciplín. Zároveň sa za sa-
mozrejme a nespochybniteľné považo-
vali tvrdenia o vedeckej výnimočnosti,
alebo aspoň výkonnosti napr. určitých
odborov, fakúlt alebo ústavov SAV, ale
aj jednotlivcov. Súčasne sa vytvárali ani
nie skupiny, ale celé kategórie prehlia-
daných odborov aj akademických inšti-
túcií, ktoré boli dlhodobo podceňované,
často až dehonestované s devastačným
dopadom na ich prestíž. Opäť dodávam,
že rovnako sa to týka(lo) aj jednotlivcov
a malých vedecko-výskumných tímov.
Prirodzená hierarchizácia vo vnútri aka-
demických komunit, v západnom civi-
lizačnom okruhu dominantne (ale žiaľ
tiež nie výlučne) postavená na podanom
vedeckom a pedagogickom výkone, je
spolu so slobodou a nezávislosťou ve-
deckého bádania hlavným motorom dy-
namiky nielen vedeckého poznania
a vedeckej metodológie, ale aj akade-
mického sociálneho poľa. V našich pod-
mienkach je popri iných, úplne mimo-
vedeckých (mimoodborných), faktoroch
deformovaná práve vyššie zmienenými
predstavami a predsudkami, čiže tým,
ako sa tri desaťročia realizujú hodno-
tenia akademických pracovísk a vedec-
kých odborov v našej krajine.

Samozrejme, od takýchto hodnotení
sa potom odvíjala aj finančná podpora
akademických inštitúcií, či už zo štát-
nej dotácie alebo z grantových agentúr.
Tieto nehoráznosti zviditeľnilo nedáv-
ne periodické hodnotenie a dovoľm si
tvrdiť, že zrozumiteľných spôsobom.


Nerád by som bol blamovaný naiv-
ným presvedčením, že jedinou príčinou
neradostného stavu slovenskej akade-
mie je zaužívaný spôsob hodnotenia
a následnej distribúcie finančných pro-
striedkov, ale dlhodobo určite zohráva
kľúčovú úlohu v procese formovania
akademického života v našej krajine
a jeho tienistých stránok. Nás však za-

ujíma predovšetkým otázka, aké zrkadlo nastavilo periodické hodnotenie sociálnej antropológie, čiže malej kvalitatívnej sociálnej vede, ktorá síce je kráľovnou spoločenských vied, ale ani vzdelanejšie segmenty našej spoločnosti nezaujíma. Je to disciplína, ktorá sa počas uplynulých dvoch desaťročí bez akejkoľvek inštitucionálnej podpory formovala (stále namáhavo formuje) na okraji akademického inštitucionálneho prostredia v podmienkach, ktoré asi najlepšie vystihuje už starší citát Petra Skalníka „anthropology in a hostile environment“. Skalník citát charakterizuje situáciu asi vo všetkých post-komunistických/post-totalitných krajinách, ale miera hostility voči snahám o konštituovanie a inštitucionalizovanie sociálnej a kultúrnej antropológie v rámci akadémie patrí v našej krajine k tým najhorším. Cieľom tohto textu nie je zamýšľať sa nad tým, prečo je to tak. Nakoniec, k tomuto problému som publikoval viacero esejí či štúdií. V tejto chvíli je dôležité však to, že odbor sociálna antropológia skončil v periodickom hodnotení akademických inštitúcií a vedeckých odborov veľmi dobre, z pohľadu niektorých pozorovateľov možno až prekvapivo dobre. Iba niekoľko, či už exaktných alebo sociálnych a humanitných vied, bolo ohodnotených lepšie. Z hľadiska budúcej perspektívy nielen antropológie a sociológie, ale aj ďalších pozitívne hodnotených spoločenskovedných odborov by bolo určite prínosné otvoriť diskusiu o hľadaní príčin a zdôvod-

není toho javu, azároveň skutočnosti, že viaceré disciplíny alebo akademické pracoviská, ktoré sa ani nie roky, ale doslova desaťročia hrajú na géniov, nedopadli s veľkou slávou. Samozrejme, o takúto otvorenú diskusiu by v akademickom sociálnom poli musel byť záujem, ktorý na základe mojich mnohoročných osobných skúseností určite nepredpokladám.

Pre sociálnu antropológiu to znamená dosiahnutie prestížnej pozície a posun z prehliadanej a ignorovanej, často vysmievannej disciplíny, medzi relevantné vedecké odbory. Asi je každému zrejmé, že antropológovia a antropologičky musia aktívne využiť túto situáciu a v budúcnosti vystupovať spôsobom, ktorý je primeraný tomuto celoslovenskému hodnoteniu. Ako človek, ktorý bol „prítom“, by som veľmi privítal, keby si to všimli aj študentky a študenti a vôbec mladí ľudia, ktorí nechcú študovať iba s cieľom získať „papier“, ale majú záujem o solídne sociálnovedné vzdelanie, teda vedomosti, poznatky a akademické zručnosti. A to nie na báze naivných rozprávok pre dospelých, rôznych ideológií a romantických koncepcií pochádzajúcich z 19. storočia, ale vedomosti zodpovedajúce modernej kvalitatívnej sociálnej vede, ktorá sa dokázala v nežičlivých, často až v nepriateľských podmienkach vypracovať medzi najlepšie hodnotené vedecké disciplíny, a zároveň je kompatibilná s akademickými pracoviskami na štandardných európskych univerzitách.







REEVALUATING ‘PERSONAL AUTONOMY’ IN HUNTER-GATHERER SOCIETIES

Daša Bombjaková

Studies concerning current egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies often emphasize personal autonomy as a defining socio-political feature. Typically, references to personal autonomy are addressed at the beginning of the paper, in an introductory description of the studied population, or in opening statements about the ethnographic setting. These references tend to be brief and function as mere labels without further explanation or examples. Consequently, the exact meaning of ‘personal autonomy’ is hard to decipher, as scholars don’t discuss it in detail, myself included (Bombjaková 2018).

The lack of clear explanation might suggest a scholarly consensus on individual autonomy’s definition. However, references differ greatly, encompassing freedom of movement and choice in social interactions (Woodburn 2005:23), high levels of personal independence

(Abels and Ninkova 2023), the absence of coercion in decision-making (Hewlett 2016:36), and the ability to survive independently from specific others (Bodenhorn 2005:79). Endicott (2011) proposes shifting from individual to cooperative autonomy, where people are granted personal freedom in their pursuits but also feel obliged to help other group members when needed. Personal autonomy is sometimes viewed as both a value and cultural practice (Gardner 1991), but it is not always apparent. The vocabulary varies from valuing personal autonomy (Leacock 1978:249) to respecting it (Woodburn 1982), emphasizing its importance (Salali et al 2019:2).

Given the heterogeneity of these definitions, it becomes necessary to describe or provide examples of how personal autonomy manifests in the society, along with explanations of the context. For instance, the definitions of autonomy in

child-focused studies often involve the non-interference of adults in children's activities, such as playing with dangerous objects, as an illustration of respect for personal autonomy (Hewlett et al. 2011; Chaudhary and Gul-Salali 2023). The child would play with a knife, and as scholars contend, adults refrain from intervening despite the potential danger of injury just because they value the child's personal autonomy. However, we lack information about the context. Adult behavior towards children playing with a knife, for instance, might differ based on whether it happens in a casual camp setting or during an ongoing ritual in a sacred place. Would adults intervene in such context? And what would it mean in terms of our understanding of valuing one's personal autonomy?

'Personal autonomy' is a Western term and we should be cautious when using it to describe hunter-gatherers. Personal autonomy in hunter-gatherer societies needs to be more thoroughly empirically

examined. We propose to incorporate additional information, specifically highlighting whether it is considered a value or a practice, or both. Moreover, it is essential to outline the specific domains of life or cultural contexts in which the value of personal autonomy is practiced or manifested. By doing so, we can gain more comprehensive understanding of the meanings of personal autonomy within various cultural settings.

Some might argue that I am not offering concrete solutions to the ambiguity surrounding personal autonomy in hunter-gatherer societies. However, this is not the aim of this brief commentary. I seek to highlight the inconsistencies and lack of contextual clarity in current scholarship – including in my own work. By raising these concerns, I hope to encourage further exploration and discussion, prompting researchers to engage more critically with the term and its application in diverse cultural settings.

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INES CHRŤAN & FILIP BOBERIĆ

Report z medzinárodnej konferencie *In, out and in between: Transnational and international migration in Southeast Europe*

V Prístine v Kosove sa od 19. do 22. septembra 2024 konala 11. konferencia Medzinárodnej asociácie pre antropológiu juhovýchodnej Európy (InASEA – The International Association for Southeast European Anthropology), pod názvom *In, out and in between: Transnational and internal migration in Southeast Europe*. Filozofická fakulta Univerzity v Prístine – ktorej Katedra antropológie organizačne zabezpečila celé podujatie – sa počas týchto dní stala pôdou na výmenu poznania a skúseností medzi vyše 100 akademických pracovníčok*kov, výskumníkov*čok a PhD. študentiek*ov pochádzajúcich z rôznych častí sveta, prevažne Európy. Výstupy boli koncipované vo formáte koncíznych prezentácií o výskumných zisteniach, prebiehajúcich projektoch či ideách, na ktoré nadväzovali diskusie v podobe otázok a odpovedí alebo kritických debát.

Nepostrádateľnú rolu zohrávalo aj „domáce“ študentstvo z Katedry antro-

pológie, ktoré sa od začiatku až do konca konferencie staralo o navigovanie účastníctva cez priestory fakulty a kampusu – v ktorom dominuje úchvatná multifunkčná socialistická budova Národnej knižnice Kosova – zabezpečovanie obeda, večery a občerstvenia počas prestávok, fotenie celého podujatia, zabezpečovanie technickej podpory a poskytovanie rôznych informácií. Zároveň niektoré*í z nich využili možnosť zúčastniť sa prezentácií, klásť otázky a diskutovať, čo sa pekne zlúčilo so skôr neformálnou povahou konferencie.

Spojovacím bodom účastníctva bol záujem o rôznorodé problematiky a aspekty migrácií v juhovýchodnej Európe. Vo výstupoch naprieč 27 panelmi boli zastúpené pestré prístupy z oblasti nielen sociálnej antropológie, ale aj sociológie, histórie, ekonómie a štatisticko-demografických vied, geografie, psychológie či mediálnej teórie. Avšak troška smutné bolo to, že v niektorých momentoch

vznikol dojem, že je podujatie exkluzívne antropologické. Napríklad, niektorí*é účastníci*čky začínali svoje prezentácie varovaním a ospravedlnením, že vlastne nie sú antropológmi*ogičkami, akoby existoval nevyslovený predpoklad, že im to automaticky znižuje hodnotu. Našťastie, celková nálada bola veľmi multidisciplinárna – dokonca úvodnú keynote prednášku o albánskych vedeckých diasporách predniesol geograf Russell King, kým druhú keynote prednášku o nadnárodnej sociálnej starostlivosti v rukách mala sociologička Peggy Levitt. Mohli sme sa stretnúť s kreatívnymi prienikmi, akými sú napríklad vzťah medzi technologicky prísnyim regulovaním hraníc v kontexte utečenectva a životom zvierat v prepojení s ich sociokultúrnym významom, alebo otázka prináležania druhej generácie kosovsko-albánskeho migrantstva cez feministickú analýzu umelecko-aktivistických prejavov a rozhovorov. Keby sme mali robiť nejaké klasifikácie, výstupy by sme skôr mohli rozdeliť podľa tematiky, metodológie a širších cieľov, čo presahovalo jednotlivé úzko definované odbory. V tomto zmysle sme si mohli všimnúť aj silné kontrasty, napr. medzi aplikovanými štúdiami pátrajúcimi po vládných riešeniach „migračných kríz“ a skôr aktivistickými alebo kritickými paradigmami vyzdvihujúce rodové, triedne, etnické a iné mocenské aspekty migračných procesov.

Čo sa týka nášho výstupu, pripravili sme prezentáciu s názvom „Narratives of belonging, conflict and solidarity: What do forced and labour post-Yugoslav migrations have in common?“ Pokúsili sme sa v podstate spojiť problematiku, ktorým sme sa predtým venovali nezávisle v našich prácach, a ktoré sa veľmi

často chápu ako odlišné fenomény. Na prvý pohľad sa skúsenosti osôb, ktoré pred 30 rokmi počas vojny v Chorvátsku a Bosne a Hercegovine prišli do Vojvodiny, a osôb, ktoré v súčasnosti prichádzajú zo Srbska na Slovensko za prácou, naozaj rozchádzajú. Avšak, opierali sme sa o fluidnejší pohľad na hranicu medzi „nútenou“ a „dobrovoľnou“ migráciou a procesuálnu kontextualizáciu migračných skúsenosti v rámci postsocialistických transformácií, ktoré naše výskumy navzájom priblížili. Hlavnú myšlienku sme konštruovali okolo nadnárodného chápania belongingu interpretujúc emické naratívy ako mytologizáciu poriadku a návratu „domov“. Ukázali sme, že domov v nadnárodnom priestore postjuhoslovanského migrantstva figuruje ako prekérny koncept vytvárania ako konfliktných, tak aj solidárnych vzťahov, sociálno-identifikačných praktík a hodnôt.

Pre nás dvoch, ktorých život sa vyvíjal v spoločnosti dominovanej srbským nacionalizmom, táto konferencia predstavovala nielen nový akademický zážitok, ale aj príležitosť preskočiť múry neúmernej nenávistej propagandy. Politický konflikt však neobišiel ani konferenciu – už v úvodnom príhovore predsedu InASEA sa témou stalo rozhodnutie srbských inštitúcií zakázať vlastným pracovníčkam*kom zúčastniť sa podujatia, aj keď spoločne so svojimi kosovskými kolegami*ynami pôsobia v InASEA. Našťastie, toto bola jediná nacionalistická absurdita, s ktorou sme sa v konferenčnom prostredí stretli. Oveľa dôležitejšie bolo to, že sme sa mohli lepšie oboznámiť so súčasnými kosovskými a inými balkánskymi výskumnými trendmi, ktoré žiaľ často za príslušnými štátnymi hranicami zväčša zostávajú nepovšimnuté.



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